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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the trial court commit reversible error in refusing 
to admit evidence of the respondent's post-accident flight under 
the facts of the instant case? 
Did the trial court commit reversible error in relation 
to the opinion testimony of appellant's expert, Val Shupe? 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Utah Rules of Evidence, 103, 401, 402, and 403, and 705 
will determine the outcome of this appeal. Due to the length of 
these provisions, the text of each is set out in Appendix A of 
this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Fisher and respondent Trapp were involved in 
an auto-pedestrian accident in Salt Lake City on June 3, 1982, at 
approximately 9:15 p.m. Fisher brought action against Trapp 
alleging that the accident was the result of Trapp's negligent 
driving. The case was tried before a jury. The jury returned a 
verdict of "no cause of action" in favor of Trapp. 
During an in-camera hearing before trial, Trapp 
acknowledged that he had failed to stop at the scene of the acci-
dent. Following the collision, Trapp continued northbound on 
Redwood Road in Salt Lake City for some distance. Trapp then 
turned around and returned to the accident site. Upon returning 
to the scene, Trapp observed an adult rendering aid and assistance 
to Fisher. 
Trapp left the scene a second time only to return again. 
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Upon his return, Trapp spoke with a police officer, but did not 
immediately identify himself as the driver of the car. After 
speaking with the officer, Trapp drove home. 
Within 30 minutes of the accident, Trapp telephoned the 
police and identified himself as the driver of the car. (Record 
at 270) 
Before trial Trapp made a motion in limine to exclude 
evidence that he failed to stop at the scene of the collision. 
(Record at 271) At the hearing on the motion, Fisher denied that 
his injuries were aggravated in any way by Trapp1s failure to 
stop. (Record at 272) Rather, Fisher contended that such evi-
dence was admissible to create an inference of consciousness of 
guilt. (Record at 272) The trial court granted Trapp1s motion to 
exclude the evidence. The trial judge ruled that the prejudicial 
effect of the evidence outweighed any probative value the evidence 
of flight might have. (Record at 273) 
At trial, both Trapp and Patrick Fisher, appellant's 
12-year old brother, testified how the accident occurred. 
(Record at 282-286 and 309-318) Appellant was unable to testify 
since he has no conscious recollection of the accident. (Record 
at 303) The investigating officer and experts for both parties 
testified on the circumstances and cause of the accident. 
(Record at 368, 69, 392 and 427) 
The following facts surrounding the collision were 
established without serious dispute at trial: 
1. At approximately 9:15 p.m. on June 3, 1982, Trapp 
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was driving north in the east lane of Redwood Road near 400 North 
in Salt Lake City. (Record at 282) 
2. The evening was dark and the headlights on Trapp1s 
vehicle were lighted on low beam. Traffic on the highway was 
heavy. (Record at 282) 
3. Just prior to the collision, Trapp1s automobile was 
traveling at approximately 38 to 40 miles per hour in a 45 mile 
per hour traffic zone. (Record at 283, 298, 315 and 366) 
4. As Trapp neared 430 North on Redwood Road, Fisher 
and his-brother Patrick were standing along the west shoulder of 
Redwood Road, waiting for traffic to clear so they could cross 
the street. (Record at 309-310) 
5. As Fisher darted across the west lane of Redwood 
Road, his brother saw the Trapp vehicle and yelled to Fisher. 
(Record at 310, 315) 
6. Fisher was nine years old at the time of his acci-
dent with Trapp. (Record at 303) 
7. There was no crosswalk at the point where Fisher 
attempted to cross Redwood Road. (Record at 306, 367) 
8. Fisher collided with the left front fender of the 
Trapp vehicle and fell backwards or "kind of sideways11, landing 
approximately one foot from where he was standing when he struck 
the automobile. (Record at 287, 296, 310, 316-318, 345, 413-416) 
A physical examination of the Trapp automobile revealed 
no damage to the front grill, headlights, hood, or windshield. 
The only physical evidence of the collision was a smudge of dirt 
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off of the left side of the vehicle. (Record at 269) Experts 
for both parties agreed at trial that Fisher collided with the 
left side of the Trapp automobile near the front wheel area. 
(Record at 345, 348, 413-416) 
Pursuant to the trial court's order, no evidence of 
Trapp's post-collision conduct was introduced at trial. The trial 
jury returned a verdict in favor of respondent Trapp. Appellant's 
motion for a new trial was denied, and appellant appeals. (Record 
at 242) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court did not commit reversible error in 
either excluding evidence of respondent's post-collision conduct 
or in limiting the testimony of appellant's expert, Val Shupe. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF RESPONDENT'S 
POST-COLLISION CONDUCT. 
A. The Determination of Evidentiary Matters is Properly 
Left to the Sound Discretion of the Trial Court. 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence grants trial 
courts considerable discretion in determining whether evidence, 
although relevant, should be excluded on grounds of prejudice, 
confusion, or waste of time. This court in Terry v. Zions Co-op 
Merchantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), reaffirmed the 
generally recognized principle that a reviewing court should 
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generally defer to the trial court's determination of evidentiary 
matters. 
In Terry, the plaintiff customer brought a malicious pro-
secution, false arrest and false imprisonment action against the 
defendant merchant arising from an alleged shoplifting incident. 
At trial, the defendant wished to introduce evidence of the plain-
tiff's prior conviction and its surrounding facts as affecting the 
issue of damages. The trial court excluded the introduction of 
the evidence, finding that the proffered evidence would have 
misled and prejudiced the jury. 
In holding that the trial judge committed no error in 
balancing the probative value of the evidence against its prejudi-
cial effect, the court stated, "When the trial judge weighs the 
matter and makes the determination, his ruling should be looked 
upon with indulgence and not disturbed unless it clearly appears 
that he abused his discretion." Id. at 323 (emphasis added). 
The broad discretion granted to trial courts under the 
Utah Rules of Evidence to determine the relevancy, materiality, or 
prejudicial nature of evidence is shown in Reiser v. Lohner, 641 
P.2d 93 (Utah 1982); and Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 
1139 (Utah 1977). 
In Reiser, the plaintiff sought recovery for personal 
injuries sustained as a result of the defendant doctor's alleged 
negligent medical treatment. The defendant doctor had failed to 
perform two medical tests on the plaintiff's mother while plain-
tiff was in utero. Plaintiff was born with severe brain damage 
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and was later diagnosed as suffering from cerebral palsy and 
spastic quadraplegia, all of which was indisputably not caused by 
the defendant's failure to adminster the two medical procedures on 
plaintiff's mother. Prior to trial, defendant made a motion in 
limine to exclude evidence that the medical procedures had not 
been taken until just prior to the plaintiff's birth. The trial 
c<?urt granted the motion. 
On appeal, this court refused to reverse the trial 
court's evidentiary ruling, stating: 
The trial judge was within the bounds of his 
authority when he excluded the tests (or 
lack of) pertaining to Rh sensitivity. It 
is undisputed that Rh sensitivity was not 
the cause of the child's injury, and any 
evidence as to the diagnosis of such sen-
sitivity therefore appears to be without 
relevance. When this is coupled with the 
potential prejudicial effect such evidence 
might have upon the jury, the trial judge 
was well within his discretion to exclude 
it. Reiser, 641 P.2d at 97 (emphasis added) 
In Martin, the plaintiff sought recovery for personal 
injuries from a fall on a sidewalk leading from the defendant's 
grocery store in Midvale. The plaintiff sought to offer an 
exhibit showing the weather conditions at the Salt Lake Airport at 
the time of the accident. The trial court sustained an objection 
to the exhibit on the grounds that the exhibit was immaterial to 
prove the weather conditions at the scene of the accident. 
In sustaining the trial court's evidentiary ruling, this 
court cited the predecessor to Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence 
and stated: 
The law is clear that in matters of 
determining materiality the trial court 
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should be accorded a large measure of 
discretion and should only be reversed if 
this discretion is abused. The weather 
report . . . had very little, if any, proba-
tive value and it could have created a 
substantial risk of confusing the issues. 
The judge did not abuse his discretion in 
excluding it. Martin, 565 P.2d at 1141. 
In view of the clear statements of this court in Terry, 
Reiser, and Martin, and the underlying principle of Rule 403 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence, the balancing of probative value 
against prejudicial effect must necessarily rest within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Since this court has heretofore 
granted broad discretion to the trial courts of this state in 
making evidentiary rulings, the trial judge's exclusion of evi-
dence of Trapp's post-collision conduct should not be disturbed 
absent evidence of clear abuse of discretion or manifest error. 
Brigham Young University v. Lillywhite, 118 F.2d 836 (10th Cir. 
1941) , cert, denied 314 U.S. 638 (1941); State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 
1338 (Utah 1977), cert, denied 439 U.S. 882 (1978); and State v. 
Gibson, 565 P.2d 783 (Utah 1977). 
B. The Prejudicial Effect of Evidence of 
Respondent's Post-Collision Conduct 
Substantially Outweighs the Probative Value 
of Such Evidence in the Instant Action. 
Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence sets forth the 
applicable standard for the exclusion of relevant evidence on the 
grounds of prejudice: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
-7-
waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
This court in Terry v. Zions Co-op Mercantile Institution, 
605 P.2d at 323, n. 31, stated: 
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial . . . 
if it has the tendency to influence the out-
come of the trial by improper means, or if 
it appeals to the jury's sympathies, or 
arouses its sense of horror, provokes its 
instincts to punish or otherwise causes a 
jury to base its decision on something other 
than the established proposition of the 
case. (quoting Lease America Corp. v. 
Insurance Co. of North America, 88 Wis.2d 
395, 276 N.W.2d 767, 770 (1979)) . 
The trial court in the instant case noted that evidence 
of flight may be relevant under certain circumstances. (Record at 
272) However, the court held that under the facts of this case, 
the limited probative value of evidence of Trapp1s post-collision 
conduct was outweighed by the tendency of the evidence to "inflame 
the jury." (Record at 272-273) The tendency of evidence of post-
accident flight to unfairly prejudice jurys is well recognized: 
[I]n many situations, the inference of 
consciousness of guilt of the particular 
crime is so uncertain and ambiguous and the 
evidence so prejudicial that one is forced 
to wonder whether the evidence is not 
directed to punishing the "wicked11 generally 
rather than resolving the issue of guilt of 
the offense charged. 
* * * 
In addition, the potential for preju-
dice for flight evidence should be weighed 
against is probative value. Critical scru-
tiny is called for in each particular case. 
McCormick on Evidence §271 , (Lawyers 3d Ed. 
1984) (emphasis added). 
Appellant asserts that evidence of Trapp1s post-collision 
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conduct raises several inferences, any of which would be helpful 
to the jury in the determination of the instant action. Although 
the relevancy of a piece of evidence proffered is crucial, the 
probative value of the evidence, standing alone, does not deter-
mine its admissibility. Terry, 605 P.2d at 322. The excluded 
evidence in the instant case is, at best, only tangentially rele-
vant, due its tendancy to allow the jury to speculate on facts 
unsupported in the record. The trial court did not err in prohi-
biting such potentially prejudicial evidence. Other courts have 
likewise noted that facts which support only conjectural infer-
ences have little, if any, probative value. Since facts sup-
porting only conjectural inferences have such limited probative 
value, at least one jurisdiction has held them to be per se inad-
missible. Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 
F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1984), (applying Colorado law); and DoIan v. 
Mitchell, 179 Colo. 359, 502 P.2d 72 (1972). 
This court in Pearce v. Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489 (Utah 
1985), recognized that trial courts have less discretion in 
admitting evidence where the evidence is shown to support only 
conjectural inferences which have little probative value, or where 
there is no evidence that the fact has any causal connection with 
the plaintiff1s injury, ^d. at 491-492. 
The plaintiff in Pearce brought a wrongful death action 
against the joint owners of a motor boat after his son drowned in 
Utah Lake. The plaintiff's teenage son went on a waterskiing trip 
with several other teenagers on the afternoon of June 1, 1979. 
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Plaintiff's son and several others had returned to their homes 
early that morning from a high school graduation party in a nearby 
canyon. In the late afternoon, a brisk breeze came up, causing 
the water to become choppy. Despite the poor conditions, plain-
tiff's son entered the water to ski all the way back to the har-
bor. As he waited in the water, the ski rope became entangled in 
the propeller, stalling the engine. Unable to dislodge the rope, 
plaintiff's son struck out to swim for the west shore of the lake. 
The boy never made it. 
In a motion in limine heard before trial, counsel for 
plaintiff requested the court to exclude any evidence that there 
had been drinking at the canyon party the night before the acci-
dent. The motion was made on the grounds that such evidence would 
be irrelevant in establishing proximate cause, and that the preju-
dicial effect of such evidence would outweigh its probative value. 
Counsel for defendant proffered evidence that plaintiff's son had 
helped sponsor the party, had bought the liquor, and had very 
little sleep before leaving the canyon at 6:00 a.m. Counsel for 
defendant further argued that the jurors should be allowed to draw 
their own inferences from this evidence as to the deceased's prior 
state of physical exhaustion. Plaintiff's motion in limine to 
exclude the evidence was denied. The trial court entered a ver-
dict of no cause of action, and plaintiff appealed. 
After noting the potential prejudicial effect of the 
admitted evidence and the limited probative value such facts would 
have in establishing the deceased's state of physical exhaustion, 
this court remanded the case to the trial court and noted: 
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If evidence has some probative value, but 
has a tendency to unduly prejudice or con-
fuse the issues or to mislead the jury, the 
trial court must balance the probative value 
against those countervailing factors to 
determine whether the evidence should be 
admitted. "Precedent . . . is of little 
value in reviewing such cases . . . . We 
simply determine whether, on the facts of 
the particular case, the trial court's 
ruling was within the reasonable or per-
missible range.11 _Id. at 492-493 (quoting 
Carlson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 57 Or.App. 
695, 646 P.2d 43, 46-47 (1982)) (emphasis 
added). 
As illustrated by Pearce and Reiser, trial courts should 
restrict the admissibility of potentially prejudicial evidence 
that supports only conjectural inferences or which is undisputably 
not a contributing factor to the accident. See also Ratterree v. 
Bartlett, 707 P.2d 1063 (Kan. 1985) (trial court excluded evidence 
concerning the smell of alcohol on defendant's breath in a per-
sonal injury action arising out of an automobile accident. Held: 
Since the excluded evidence was not a contributing factor in the 
accident, the trial court correctly ruled the evidence of the 
smell of alcohol on defendant's breath would be more prejudicial 
than probative). 
Although appellant cites several cases which hold evi-
dence of post-accident flight admissible under certain circum-
stances, other courts have held such evidence to be inadmissible. 
See Freeman v. Anderson, 279 Ark. 282, 651 S.W.2d 450 (1983); 
Spencer v. Adams, 37 Ga.Ct.App. 344, 140 S.E. 390 (1927); Clark v. 
Mask, 232 Miss. 65, 98 So.2d 467 (1957); and Barnes v. Gaines, 668 
P.2d 1175 (Okla.Ct.App. 1983). 
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As this court stated in Pearce, case precedent is of 
little value in reviewing a trial court's determination of 
whether evidence is unfairly prejudicial. Pearce, 701 P.2d at 
492. A trial court's ruling under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence is most often a fact intensive decision that should not 
be applied blindly to cases involving different facts and cir-
cumstances. Flight from the scene of a tragedy may be quite as 
consistent with innocence as with negligence. One, who, despite 
due care, kills or injures another, may through ignorance of the 
law or through panic flee from the scene of his act, and yet be 
perfectly innocent. It would be a dangerous rule which would per-
mit the jury to consider flight as evidence of negligence in every 
case. See People v. Cismadija, 167 Mich. 210, 132 N.W. 489 
(1911). The equivocal nature of respondent's flight under the 
circumstances of this case should be of particular concern to this 
court. 
The cases cited by appellant for the proposition that 
evidence of post-accident flight is admissible are clearly 
distinguishable on their facts. First, the trial of the instant 
action demonstrated that there is little, if any, dispute how the 
accident occurred. Trapp admitted that he did not see Fisher 
until the moment of impact. (Record at 285) It was undisputed at 
trial that the point of impact was on the side of the Trapp 
vehicle. (Record at 296, 310, 345, 369, 371, and 413-416) The 
only dispute in the instant action was on the part of the experts 
on whether Trapp had sufficient time to see Fisher and to take 
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evasive action to avoid the collision. (Record at 334-338, and 
390-392) 
In Petroleum Carrier Corp. v. Snyder, 161 F.2d 323 (5th 
Cir. 1947), cited by appellant, there were serious disputes on 
whether the defendant was speeding prior to the moment of impact, 
whether the defendant was on the wrong side of the road, whether 
the plaintiff was on the wrong side of the road, and whether the 
defendant had failed to dim his lights as required by state law. 
Shaddy v. Daley, 58 Idaho 536, 76 P.2d 279 (1938), is similarly 
distinguishable. In Shaddy, there were a serious factual disputes 
on whether the defendant's truck had its headlights lighted, 
whether the defendant's truck struck the decedent on the highway, 
and whether the defendant was speeding at the moment of impact. 
Other cases cited by appellant involving serious factual disputes 
include Harrington v. Sharff, 305 F.2d 333 (2nd Cir. 1962), and 
State v. Ford, 109 Conn. 490, 146 A. 828 (1929). 
Second, unlike the instant case, where eyewitnesses to 
the accident were able to testify as to how the accident occurred, 
several of the cases cited by appellant involve factual situations 
where there were no eyewitnesses to the accident. As a result, in 
those cases there was little, if any, way to determine how the 
accident occurred. In the instant case, the jury was able to hear 
testimony both from Fisher's brother, Patrick, and from Trapp on 
how the accident occurred. 
Since the trial jury in the instant case heard direct 
testimony on the facts and circumstances of the accident, the jury 
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did not need to consider the possible inferences that Fisher 
attempted to raise through the introduction of evidence of Trapp1s 
post-collision conduct. Such conjectural inferences could have 
confused the jury and distracted them from deciding the case on 
the direct testimony of the two eyewitnesses to the accident. 
Cases cited by appellant where no eyewitnesses were available to 
testify how the accident occurred include: Brooks v. E. J. Willig 
Truck Transportation Co., 40 Cal.2d 669, 455 P.2d 802 (1953); 
State v. Ford, 109 Conn. 490, 146 A. 828 (1929); Busbee v. 
Quarrier, 172 So.2d 17 (Fla.Ct.App. 1965); Waycot v. Northeast 
Ins. Co., 465 A.2d 854 (Maine 1983); Johnson v. Austin, 406 Mich. 
420, 280 N.W.2d 9 (1979); and Jones v. Strelecki, 49 N.J. 513, 231 
A.2d 558 (1967). 
Third, several of the cases cited by appellant are 
distinguishable from the instant case, since the evidence of 
flight was admissible to impeach the credibility of defendants who 
denied involvement in the accidents giving rise to those cases. 
See Dean v. Cole, 217 F.Supp. 280 (E.D. S.C. 1963); Greenwood v. 
Bailey, 184 So. 289 (Ala.Ct.App. 1938); Grzys v. Connecticut Co., 
123 Conn. 605, 198 A. 259 (1938); Busbee v. Quarrier, 172 So.2d 17 
(Fla.Ct.App. 1965); and Vuillemot v. August J. Claverie & Co., 125 
So. 168 (La. 1929). 
In the instant case, respondent Trapp voluntarily 
telephoned the police within 30 minutes of the accident to advise 
them that he had been involved in the accident with appellant 
Fisher. Furthermore, at trial, Trapp unequivocally testified that 
-14-
he was the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident giving 
rise to this case. Under such circumstances, evidence of Trapp's 
post-collision conduct has little, if any, probative value. 
Fourth, as several of the cases cited by appellant 
suggest evidence of post-accident flight may have probative value 
where there is an allegation that the plaintiff is entitled to 
punitive damages as a result of the defendant's gross negligence 
or where the plaintiff's injuries were aggravated due to the 
defendant's failure to stop and render assistance. See Brooks v. 
E. J. Willig Truck Transportation Co., 40 Cal.2d 669, 455 P.2d 802 
(1953); Langenstein v. Reynaud, 13 La.App. 272, 127 So. 764 
(1930); Richards v. Office Products Co., 55 Ohio App.2d 143, 380 
N.E.2d 725 (1977); and Hallman v. Cushman, 196 S.C. 402, 13 S.E.2d 
498 (1941). These cases are clearly distinguishable from the 
instant case, since Fisher's complaint against Trapp did not 
allege that the accident was due to any gross negligence on the 
part of Trapp nor does Fisher contend that his injuries were 
aggravated due to Trapp's failure to immediately stop and render 
aid at the accident scene. 
Fifth, unlike in Johnson v. Austin, 406 Mich. 420, 280 
N.W.2d 9 (1979), and Jones v. Strelecki, 49 N.J. 513, 231 A.2d 
558 (1967), cited by appellant, the instant case does not involve 
the special public policy concerns eminating from an unidentified 
motorist act. It is clear that the public policy considerations 
underlying under such acts favor compensation. Since the flight 
of the unidentified motorist may result in the plaintiff losing 
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the evidence necessary to establish his claim under such an act, 
courts are more willing to allow inferences to be drawn from the 
driver1s flight to allow injured parties to recover, who without 
the inference would most likely be unable to recover. The public 
policy concerns present in Johnson and Jones are not present in 
the instant case. Although some evidence has been lost due to 
Fisher's inability to testify at trial, ample evidence on how the 
accident occurred was presented at trial. 
In sum, the cases cited by Fisher demonstrate the proba-
tive value of evidence of flight under certain limited circum-
stances: 1) where there are serious fact disputes surrounding the 
accident; 2) where there are no eyewitnesses to the accident; 
3) where the defendant denies involvement in the accident; 
4) where the plaintiff's injuries are aggravated by the flight; 
and 5) where special statutory based public policy concerns favor 
a finding of negligence. The instant action does not fall within 
any of the above-cited categories. Under the circumstances of 
this case, the prejudicial effect of admitting evidence of Trapp's 
post-collision conduct clearly outweighs the probative value of 
such evidence. 
POINT II. 
EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING 
EVIDENCE OF RESPONDENT'S POST-COLLISION 
CONDUCT, SUCH ERROR WAS HARMLESS AND DOES 
NOT WARRANT REMAND. 
Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that pre-
judicial error will not occur unless the excluded evidence affects 
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a substantial right of the aggrieved party. In determining 
whether a substantial right of the appellant has been affected by 
the exclusion of evidence of Trapp's post-collision conduct, this 
court should consider the whole record. This court should not 
find an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court unless 
this court, after reviewing the whole record, is left with a 
definite and firm conviction that the trial court erred in its 
ruling. Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc. v. Stepanoff, 650 P.2d 375 
(Alaska 1982). The test for determining whether the alleged error 
on the part of the trial court is prejudicial to the appellant is 
whether, upon a review of the record, it sufficiently appears that 
the rights of the appellant have been injuriously affected by the 
error, or that he has suffered a miscarriage of justice. See 5 
Am.Jur.2d Appeal & Error §783 (1962). 
In Gull Laboratories, Inc. v. Lewis A. Roser Co., 589 
P.2d 756, 759 (Utah 1978), this court established that "a jury 
verdict will only be upset where the error committed was so 
substantial and prejudicial that there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the result would have been different in the absence of such 
error.11 Although appellant asserts that the exclusion of evidence 
of Trapp's post-collision conduct affected his substantial rights, 
the better-reasoned authorities find that the exclusion of evi-
dence with only slight or conjectural value does not constitute 
reversible error. See 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal & Error §802 (1962). 
As previously stated herein, the evidence of Trapp's 
post-collision conduct supported only conjectural inferences of 
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negligence. Such inferences have little, if any, probative value. 
See Pearce v. Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489 (Utah 1985); and DoIan v. 
Mitchell, 179 Colo. 359, 502 P.2d 72 (Colo. 1972). Since the 
excluded evidence in the instant case had such little probative 
value, it is impossible to conclude that there is ua reasonable 
likelihood that the result would have been different" had such 
evidence been admitted at trial. Absent such a showing, this 
court should hold that the trial court's ruling did not result in 
a miscarriage of justice or the denial of any substantial right of 
the appellant. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN RELATION TO THE TESTIMONY OF 
APPELLANT'S EXPERT, VAL SHUPE. 
A. The Determination of Matters of Foundation is 
Properly Left to the Sound Discretion of the Trial 
Court. 
While the Utah Rules of Evidence permit opinion testimony 
on an ultimate issue, it is clear that not all opinions are 
admissible. The opinion testimony of lay and expert witnesses 
requires that the witness1 opinion have a basis in fact. This 
court in Utah Dept. of Transportation v. Jones, 694 P.2d 1031, 
1036 (Utah 1984), stated: 
Admission of any type of testimony requires 
the laying of proper foundation to qualify 
the witness to give the particular testimony 
sought to be elicited. (Emphasis added). 
Despite the liberality accorded to expert testimony under 
the Utah Rules of Evidence, a foundation must still be laid for 
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expert opinion testimony no matter what technique of presentation 
is employed. As a result, expert opinion testimony should be 
excluded if its factual foundation is inadequate. See 31 
Am.Jur.2d Expert & Opinion Evidence §36 (1967); and 11 Moore's 
Federal Practice §705.10, note 1 (1985). 
This court in Day v. Lorenzo Smith & Son, Inc., 17 Utah 
2d 221, 408 P.2d 186 (1965), recognized that a foundation must 
still be laid for expert opinion testimony. In Day, the plaintiff 
brought action seeking recovery for personal injuries sustained in 
an automobile collision. The crucial factual question was which 
vehicle was in the wrong lane at the time of the accident. 
Defendant called a Utah Highway Patrolman with 24 years experience 
of accident investigation to testify as to the point of impact. 
The investigating officer was at the scene investigating 
another accident when the instant collision occurred. However, 
his back was to the highway and he did not see the actual impact. 
The officer did observe the movements of the vehicles immediately 
afterwards. The officer also examined and measured the skid marks 
and debris left by the vehicles following their collision. The 
officer's qualification as an expert in accident investigations 
was not challenged at trial. However, when the defendant 
attempted to elicit the officer's opinion as to the point of 
impact, the plaintiff objected on the grounds of lack of foun-
dation. The objection was overruled and the officer was allowed 
to give his opinion as to the point of the impact. 
On appeal, this court held the trial court's admission of 
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the officer's testimony to be prejudicial error. In reaching that 
decision, the court stated: 
[W]e believe the proper rule to be that a 
trial judge, in his discretion, may permit a 
qualified expert (in this case an 
experienced Highway Patrolman) to give his 
opinion as to the point of collision when a 
proper foundation for the opinion has been 
laid. 
ic ic ic 
[W]e hold that it was error to permit 
[the Highway Patrolman's] testimony as to 
the point of impact because his opinion was 
not supported by sufficient facts and, what 
meager facts he did testify to were not con-
nected up or related to his opinion. They 
were inadequate to support his conclusion. 
Day, 408 P.2d at 187, 189. (Emphasis in 
original). 
Similarly, in Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328 (Utah 
1979), this court held that an adequate foundation must be laid 
before an expert's opinion is admitted into evidence. The action 
in Edwards arose out of a two-car automobile collision. At trial, 
the plaintiff presented the testimony of the investigating 
officer. The officer testified to his expertise in accident 
investigation and to what he saw and did in the course of his 
investigation. He testified to the length and location of skid 
marks, the speed of the automobiles, the point of impact, and 
various other facts and inferences. At the conclusion of the 
officer's direct examination, the following took place: 
Q [By plaintiff's attorney] . . . 
From the information that you have, your 
independent investigation, talking with the 
witnesses, observing the situation, have you 
reached an opinion, have you formed an opi-
nion as to what the cause of this accident 
was? 
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A Yes. 
Q And would you give us that opinion? 
A Mr. Christian: I object to that, 
your honor. 
The Court: Sustained. Id. at 1329. 
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the officer's 
opinion had been erroneously excluded by the trial court. In 
sustaining the lower court's exclusion of the expert's opinion, 
this court noted the requirement that adequate foundation be laid 
before an expert's opinion is admitted into evidence: 
The admissibility of accident reconstruction 
evidence depends in large measure upon the 
foundation laid. The expertise of the wit-
ness, his degree of familiarity with the 
necessary facts, and the logical nexus 
between his opinion and the facts adduced 
must be established. When such a foundation 
is laid, Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence [predecessor to the current Rule 
703] makes an expert's opinion admissible, 
even though it embraces an ultimate issue, 
^d. at 1331. 
See also Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641, 644-645 (Utah 1980) 
(courts should establish whether sufficient foundation has been 
laid for an expert to render expert opinion testimony). 
Other courts have likewise held that an expert's opinion 
must be based upon sufficient foundation in order to be 
admissible. In Kingsbury v. Hickey, 56 Or.App. 492, 642 P.2d 339 
(1982), the plaintiff's accident reconstruction expert testified 
that he had examined one of the damaged vehicles, visited the 
scene of the accident, took measurements of the damage sustained 
by one of the vehicles, and examined undamaged vehicles similar to 
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those involved in the accident. The witness1 qualifications as an 
expert in mechanical engineering were not challenged. The trial 
court, upon appropriate objection by the defendant, excluded the 
expertfs opinion as to the speed of the vehicles and the point of 
impact. 
In affirming the trial court's exclusion of the evidence 
offered by the expert accident reconstructionist, the Oregon Court 
of Appeals noted: 
An expert's opinion is admissible only if 
based on facts in evidence or on facts 
within the personal knowledge of the expert. 
Expert evidence offered with sufficient 
foundation is too speculative and therefore 
not admissible. 
•k * "k 
The burden of proving a proper foun-
dation for an expert opinion is on the pro-
ponent of the evidence . . . . When the 
factual foundation is lacking or unreliable, 
the evidence should be excluded. The trial 
judge was entitled to conclude that the wit-
ness' estimate of the speed of the vehicles 
upon which his evidence on their point of 
impact depended lacked a reliable factual 
foundation and was speculative. Kingsbury, 
642 P.2d at 341-342 (citations omitted). 
As with other evidentiary matters, the determination of 
adequate foundation is solely within the discretion of the trial 
court. Tjas v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438 (Utah 1979). In citing the 
general rule of deference to be accorded to trial court decisions 
on evidentiary matters, this court in Terry v. Zions Co-op 
Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314, 322-323 (Utah 1979), stated: 
It is generally conceded the trial court is 
more competent, in the exercise of this 
discretion, to judge the exigencies of a 
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particular case and, therefore, when exer-
cised within normal limits, the discretion 
should not be disturbed. The general rule 
followed by this court is the judgment of 
the trial court will not be reversed unless 
it is shown that the discretion exercised 
therein has been abused. 
In sum, this court should be reluctant to interfere with the lower 
court1s ruling in the instant matter unless there is evidence that 
the trial court's discretion has been manifestly abused to the 
prejudice of the complaining party. 
B. Appellant Initially Failed to Lay Adequate 
Foundation at Trial for the Opinion of His Expert. 
On the first day of trial appellant called and certified 
Val Shupe as an accident reconstruction expert. (Record at 
320-321) No objection was raised as to Mr. Shupe1s qualifica-
tions. Shupe also testified about the examinations and calcula-
tions which he made in preparation for his testimony at trial. 
(Record at 322-327) When Fisher attempted to elicit Shupe1s 
opinion as to the cause of the accident, respondent timely 
objected on the grounds of lack of foundation for said opinion. 
Out of the hearing of the jury, Shupe offered the following 
opinion: 
Q (By Mr. Hansen) What's the cause of 
the accident in your opinion, Mr. Shupe? 
A My opinion, my opinion as far as 
what the cause of the accident, the speed 
was too fast for the conditions surrounding 
it. 
Q Any other cause? 
A Yes, sir. I feel he was not totally 
aware of what -- of the circumstances in 
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front of him for the distance that he was 
away from the pedestrian. (Record at 334) 
The trial court then carefully examined the factual 
underpinnings of Mr. Shupefs opinion, and concluded that there was 
insufficient foundation for Mr. Shupe to base that opinion. 
(Record at 328-334) Although, the court excluded Shupe1s opinion 
as to the cause of the accident, the court allowed Shupe to 
testify on how far back Trapp was from the point of impact when 
Fisher began crossing the road. (Record at 338-339) 
In excluding Shupe1s opinion as to the cause of the acci-
dent, the trial court correctly determined that Shupe's opinion 
was not sufficiently grounded in the relevant facts of the case. 
Under Rule 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the trial court has 
discretion in requiring the prior disclosure of the facts or data 
which underly an expert's opinion testimony. 
During the proffer of testimony outside of the juryfs 
presence, it was clear that counsel for appellant had not 
established sufficient foundation for the admission of his 
expert's opinion. Notwithstanding appellant's presentation of 
evidence on where Trapp was when appellant entered the roadway, 
appellant failed to ask the essential foundational question, the 
answer to which might have resulted in Shupe's opinion being 
admitted, "Where was Trapp when he could have perceived Fisher and 
taken evasive action?" Until such a question was asked and 
answered, there was no foundation for any testimony regarding 
Trapp's alleged negligence in failing to perceive Fisher in the 
roadway and in failing to take appropriate evasive action. Fisher 
-24-
was further unable to point to any physical evidence (e.g., skid 
marks) as to Trapp's actual perception of Fisher in the highway. 
Physical evidence was lacking on several other key factors, such 
as the location of other cars which might have obstructed Trapp's 
opportunity to perceive Fisher in the roadway and the angle of the 
headlight beam of Trapp's vehicle. Without taking such factors 
into consideration, the trial court correctly ruled that Fisher 
failed to lay adequate foundation for Shupe's opinion. 
It is important to note that the essence of Shupe's 
opinion, i.e., the few factual bases upon which the opinion was 
based, was presented to the jury. Mr. Shupe's testimony was 
excluded only to preclude the drawing of a conclusion from the 
admitted evidence. The following testimony by Mr. Shupe 
demonstrates that the essence of his excluded opinion was before 
the jury: 
Q (By Mr. Hansen) Before we recess, 
I'm not sure that you gave us the manner in 
which you computed how long it would take 
this young boy to run out to the point of 
impact. Did you do that? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And that time was what, around? 
A From the time for him to run into 
the road? 
Q Yes. 
A Approximately 2.5 seconds. 
Q Now, assuming that that's how long 
it took? Then can you calculate from that 
how far back the Trapp vehicle, the defen-
dant's car was at the time the boy started 
to run? 
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A Yes. Traveling at 40 miles per 
hour, he would be traveling at 58.68 feet 
per second. That would place him back 
approximately 146 feet from the point of 
impact at the time the boy started to run 
into the road. 
Q Now, is there any way from those 
calculations to determine whether or not he, 
in fact, saw the boy when he first started 
out; that is, started across. 
A Well, he would have to have, as we 
talked about, he would have to have percep-
tion and a reaction, and that perception and 
reaction would take up so many feet. And in 
this particular case, it would take up 86 
feet. But there was no evidence that I 
found or anything through investigation to 
indicate that he made any evasive action 
whatsoever. And also from reading from his 
deposition, he never saw the boy until the 
boy hit the car, struck the car, indicating 
he made no evasive action whatsoever. 
(Record at 338-339) 
C. Any Error Which Might Have Been Committed by 
the Trial Court's Exclusion of Shupe's 
Opinion was Cured by the Subsequent Admission 
of the Very Same Opinion During Later 
Testimony. 
On the second day of trial, Fisher called his expert 
accident reconstructionist back to the stand to testify. Shupe 
testified that following his initial testimony in the matter, he 
had acquired additional information with respect to the accident. 
He testified that he had returned to the scene of the accident 
with appellant and appellant's family to get additional infor-
mation as to the position of Trapp's vehicle at the time Fisher 
entered the road. Shupe then opined that Trapp was 201 feet away 
from the point of impact when Fisher entered the road. The record 
then reveals: 
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Q Based on that new information and 
based on all the depositions and interroga-
tories that you read and your investigation 
of this accident, do you have an opinion as 
to the cause of this accident? 
A Yes, sir, I do. 
Q And what is that opinion? 
A My opinion is that the gentleman was 
proceeding too fast for the conditions and 
that he had improper lookout of the 
situation^ (Record at 427) (Emphasis added) 
Courts have consistently held that the improper exclusion 
of competent testimony constitutes harmless error where essen-
tially the same evidence is established later by the same witness, 
other witnesses, or by other means. See P. A. Sorensen Co. v. 
Denver & Rio Grand Railroad Co., 49 Utah 548, 164 P. 1020 (1917); 
Millsap v. Williamson, 294 Ala. 634, 320 So.2d 649 (1975); 
Bailey v. Leonard, 625 P.2d 849 (Alaska 1981); State v. Caldwell, 
117 Ariz. 464, 573 P.2d 864 (1977); In Re Ching's Estate, 46 
Hawaii 127, 376 P.2d 125 (1962); and Duran v. Mueller, 79 Nev. 
453, 386 P.2d 733 (Nev. 1963). 
Careful scrutiny of the entire record in this case reveals 
that the subsequent testimony by appellant's expert, Val Shupe, was 
as broad and comprehensive as that initially excluded by the trial 
court. Furthermore, the essence of Shupefs opinion was never 
excluded at any time from the jury. The jury was equally competent 
to draw the desired inferences and conclusions from the underlying 
facts which were admitted into evidence without objection. Since 
the underlying facts were presented to the jury and the subsequent 
questioning of Shupe gave testimony which had the effect of 
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answering the question to which the previous objection had been 
sustained, any error committed by the trial court in limiting the 
testimony of Val Shupe was harmless error. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no dispute in this case that Trapp's post-
collision conduct did not contribute to Fisher's injuries. At 
most, the excluded evidence was to create an inference of negli-
gence on the part of Trapp. In excluding evidence with little, if 
any, probative value, the trial court did not abuse the broad 
discretion given to it under the Utah Rules of Evidence. As a 
result, the trial court's ruling on the exclusion of such evidence 
cannot be said to have affected any substantial right of the 
appellant. 
Similarly, the trial court's action in requiring Fisher 
to lay sufficient foundation before admitting the opinion of his 
expert as to the cause of the accident in question is clearly 
recognized and permitted under the Utah Rules of Evidence. The 
trial court was correct in finding that the appellant had not met 
its burden of proving a proper foundation for the opinion which it 
attempted to elicit from its expert. Assuming arguendo that the 
trial court erred in its ruling in relation to the testimony of 
Val Shupe, it is clear that the initial exclusion of the expert's 
ultimate conclusion was rendered harmless since the essence of Mr. 
Shupe's conclusion was allowed into evidence and Shupe's conclu-
sion was later admitted into evidence, without objection. 
-28-
Therefore, respondent respectfully requests that this 
court affirm the evidentiary rulings of the trial court in this 
matter,
 A 
Dated this 3 day of , 1986. 
STRONG & HANNI 
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Henry E. He* 
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APPENDIX A 
RULE 103 
RULINGS ON EVIDENCE 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be pre-
dicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a 
substantial right of party is affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one 
admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to 
strike appears of record, stating the specific 
ground of objection, if the specific ground was not 
apparent from the context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one 
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence 
was made known to the court by offer or was 
apparent from the context within which questions 
were asked. 
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any 
other or further statement which shows the character of the evi-
dence, the form in which it was offered, the objection made, and 
the ruling thereon. It may direct the making of an offer in 
question and answer form. 
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall 
be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent inad-
missible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, 
such as making statements or offers of proof or asking questions 
in the hearing of the jury. 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking 
notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they 
were not brought to the attention of the court. 
RULE 401 
DEFINITION OF "RELEVANT EVIDENCE" 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency 
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence. 
A1 
RULE 402 
RELEVANT EVIDENCE GENERALLY 
ADMISSIBLE: IRRELEVANT 
EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise 
provided by the Constitution of the United States or the 
Constitution of the State of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or 
by other rules applicable in courts of this State. Evidence 
which is not relevant is not admissible. 
RULE 403 
EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT 
EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE 
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presen-
tation of cumulative evidence. 
RULE 705 
DISCLOSURE OF FACTS OR 
DATA UNDERLYING EXPERT OPINION 
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference 
and give his reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the 
underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. 
The expert may in any event be required to disclose the 
underlying facts or date on cross-examination. 
A2 
